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Abstract. Property-directed reachability (PDR) is a SAT/SMT-based
reachability algorithm that incrementally constructs inductive invariants.
After it was successfully applied to hardware model checking, several
adaptations to software model checking have been proposed. We con-
tribute a replicable and thorough comparative evaluation of the state of
the art: We (1) implemented a standalone PDR algorithm and, as im-
provement, a PDR-based auxiliary-invariant generator for k -induction,
and (2) performed an experimental study on the largest publicly avail-
able benchmark set of C verification tasks, in which we explore the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of software verification with PDR. The main con-
tribution of our work is to establish a reproducible baseline for ongoing
research in the area by providing a well-engineered reference implemen-
tation and an experimental evaluation of the existing techniques.
Keywords: Software verification, Program analysis, Invariant generation,
Property-directed reachability (PDR), IC3, k -Induction, VVT, CPAchecker
1 Introduction
Automatic software verification [26] is a broad research area with many success
stories and large impact on technology that is applied in industry [2, 15, 29]. It
nicely complements other general approaches to ensure functional correctness,
like software testing [33] and interactive software verification [3]. One large sub-
area of automatic software verification includes algorithms and approaches that
are based on SMT technology. There are classic approaches like bounded model
checking [11], predicate abstraction [1, 20], and k-induction [4, 28, 34], which are
well understood and evaluated; a recent survey [5] provides a uniform overview
and sheds light on the differences of the algorithms. Property-directed reacha-
bility (PDR) [13] is a relatively recent (2011) approach that is not yet included
in surveys and comparative evaluations. The approach was originally applied
to transition systems from hardware designs, but was also adapted to software
verification in the last years [12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 27, 30, 31].
While in theory, the advantages and disadvantages of using PDR seem clear,
we are interested in understanding the effect of applying PDR to a large set
of verification tasks that were collected from academia and also from industrial
software, such as the Linux kernel. To achieve this goal, we implemented one
PDR adaptation for software verification, and another approach that integrates
a PDR-like invariant-generation module into a k-induction approach.
PDR Adaptation for Software Verification. PDR is a model-checking algorithm
that tries to construct an inductive safety invariant by incrementally learning
clauses that are inductive relative to previously learned clauses. The clause-
learning strategy is guided by counterexamples to induction, i.e., each time a
proof of inductiveness fails, the algorithm attempts to learn a new clause to
avoid the same counterexample to induction in the future. Originally, this algo-
rithm was designed as a SAT-based technique for Boolean finite-state systems.
Every adaptation of PDR to software verification therefore needs to consider how
to effectively and efficiently handle the infinite state space and how to transfer
the algorithm from SAT to SMT. Furthermore, the adaptation to software has
to deal with the program counter.
PDR-like Invariant Generation. Whenever an induction-proof attempt fails with
a counterexample, the counterexample describes a state s that can transition
into a bad state (that violates the safety property), which means that in order
to make the proof succeed, s must be removed from consideration by an aux-
iliary invariant. From this bad-state predecessor s, the clause-learning strategy
of PDR proceeds to generate such an auxiliary invariant by applying the follow-
ing two steps: (1) s is first generalized to a set of states C that all transition
into a bad state; (2) an invariant is constructed that is (a) inductive relative
to previously found invariants1 and (b) at least strong enough to eliminate all
states in C. If it fails to construct such an invariant and prove its inductiveness,
then the steps are recursively re-applied to the counterexample obtained from
the failed induction attempt.
We experimentally investigate two implementations of adaptations of PDR
to software verification (CPAchecker-CTIGAR and Vvt-CTIGAR), as well as
several combinations that use the PDR-like invariant-generation module that
we designed and implemented for this study.
Example. Figure 1 shows an example C program (eq2.c) that contains four
unsigned integer variables w, x, y, and z. In line 10, the variable w is initialized
to an unknown value via the input function __VERIFIER_nondet_uint(); then,
its value is copied to x in line 11. In line 12, variable y is initialized with the
value of w + 1, and in line 13, variable z is initialized with the value of x + 1,
such that at this point, w and x are equal to each other, and y and z are also
equal to each other. Then, from line 14 to line 17, a loop with a nondeterminis-
tic exit condition (and therefore an unknown number of iterations) increments
in each iteration both variables y and z. Lastly, line 18 asserts that after the
1 An assertion F is said to be inductive relative to an invariant Inv
if Inv can be used as an auxiliary invariant for the proof of induc-
tiveness ∀sj , sj+1 : F (sj) ∧ T (sj, sj+1)⇒ F (sj+1) by conjoining Inv to
the induction hypothesis F (sj), such that the modified induction query
∀sj , sj+1 : F (sj)∧ Inv(sj) ∧ T (sj, sj+1)⇒ F (sj+1) allows a proof by induction to
succeed. [13]
1 extern void __VERIFIER_error() __attribute__
→֒ ((__noreturn__));
2 extern unsigned int __VERIFIER_nondet_uint(void);
3 void __VERIFIER_assert(int cond) {
4 if (!(cond)) {
5 ERROR: __VERIFIER_error();
6 }
7 return;
8 }
9 int main(void) {
10 unsigned int w = __VERIFIER_nondet_uint();
11 unsigned int x = w;
12 unsigned int y = w + 1;
13 unsigned int z = x + 1;
14 while (__VERIFIER_nondet_uint()) {
15 y++;
16 z++;
17 }
18 __VERIFIER_assert(y == z);
19 return 0;
20 }
Fig. 1: Example C program eq2.c
loop, y and z are (still) equal to each other. Since y and z are equal before the
loop, and are always incremented together within the loop, the invariant y = z
is inductive. However, since there is no direct connection between y and z but
only an indirect one via their shared dependency on w, naïve data-flow-based
techniques may fail to find this invariant. In fact, we tried several configurations
of the verification framework CPAchecker, and found that many of them fail
to prove this program:
• Plain k -induction without auxiliary-invariant generation fails, because it
never checks if y = z is a loop invariant and instead only checks the reacha-
bility of the assertion failure (located after loop). The reachability of the as-
sertion failure, in turn, depends on the nondeterministic loop-exit condition.
Therefore we cannot conclude from “the assertion failure was not reached
in k previous iterations” that “the assertion failure cannot be reached in the
next iteration”: In the absence of auxiliary invariants, a valid counterexample
to this induction hypothesis would always be that in the previous iterations
the assertion condition was in fact violated and an assertion failure was not
reached only because the loop was not exited.
• A data-flow analysis based on the abstract domain of Boxes [22] fails, because
it is not able to track variable equalities.
• A data-flow analysis based on a template Eq for tracking the equality of pairs
of variables fails, because while it detects the invariant w = x, it is unable to
make the step to y = z due to the inequalities between w and y, and x and z,
respectively.
• For consistency with our evaluation, we also applied a data-flow analysis
based on a template for tracking whether a variable is even or odd; obviously
this is not useful for this program, and thus, this configuration also fails.
• Even combining the previous three techniques into a compound invariant
generator that computes auxiliary invariants for k -induction does not yield
a successful configuration for this verification task.
• The invariant generator KIPDR (the above-mentioned adaptation of PDR
to k -induction, which we present in more detail in Sect. 3), however, detects
the invariant y = z and is therefore able to construct a proof by induction
for this verification task.
We will now briefly sketch how KIPDR detects the invariant y = z for the
example verification task. At first, KIPDR attempts to prove by induction that
when line 18 is reached, the assertion condition holds, which fails as discussed
previously. However, this failed induction attempt yields a counterexample to
induction where the values of y and z differ from each other, e.g., y = 0∧ z = 1,
which is then generalized to y 6= z, i.e., a set of states that includes the concrete
predecessor of a bad state from the counterexample, as well as many other states
that would violate the assertion, if they were reachable themselves. Then, KIPDR
attempts to find an inductive invariant that eliminates all of these states, and
the attempt succeeds with the invariant y = z. Afterwards, KIPDR re-attempts
its original induction proof to show that the assertion is never violated, which
now succeeds due to the auxiliary invariant y = z.
Contributions. We present the following contributions:
• We implement one adaptation of PDR to software verification (based
on [12, 21]) in the open-source verification framework CPAchecker, in or-
der to establish a baseline for comparison with new ideas for improvement.
• We design and implement the algorithm KIPDR, as a new module for invari-
ant generation that is based on ideas from PDR and use this module as an
extension to a state-of-the-art approach to k -induction [4].
• We conduct a large experimental study to compare several tools and ap-
proaches to software verification using PDR as a component, in order to
highlight strengths and weaknesses of PDR in the domain of software verifi-
cation.
• We contribute a set of small examples that need invariants that are more dif-
ficult to obtain for standard data-flow-based approaches than the invariants
necessary for programs in the large benchmark set.
Related Work.While PDR (also known as IC3 for its first implementation [13])
was introduced as a SAT-based algorithm for model checking finite-state Boolean
transition systems [14], several approaches have since then been presented to ex-
tend it to SMT and to apply it to the verification of software models: PDR
has been suggested as an interpolation engine for Impact, but experiments have
shown that it is too expensive in the general case, and is most effective if only
applied as a fall-back engine for cases where a cheaper interpolation engine fails
to produce useful interpolants [16]. It also has been proposed to improve this ap-
proach by tracking control-flow locations explicitly instead of symbolically [31],
thereby avoiding the problem that many iterations of the algorithm are spent
only to learn the control flow, and this idea has later been extended by sev-
eral improvements to the generalization step of PDR [30]. Another approach is
to model the program using a Boolean abstraction, which has the advantage
that it requires only few changes to the original algorithm, but the disadvantage
that a refinement procedure is necessary to handle the spurious paths intro-
duced by the abstraction: One such approach uses infeasible error paths (i.e.,
counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [18]) to refine the ab-
straction [17], while another (CTIGAR) uses counterexamples to induction [12];
both of these refinement techniques use interpolation to obtain abstraction pred-
icates; the latter of the two techniques is used in two of the configurations we
compare in our evaluation (CPAchecker-CTIGAR and Vvt-CTIGAR [21]). A
different extension of PDR to verify infinite-state systems that does not require
abstraction refinement is property-directed k -induction [27], which increases the
power of the induction checks used in PDR by applying k-induction instead of
1-induction, and which uses model-based generalization in addition to interpo-
lation to reason about potentially-infinite sets of states. Unfortunately, support
for effective model-based generalization is rare in SMT solvers 2, making this ap-
proach impractical. In contrast, our KIPDR algorithm presented in Sect. 3 only
requires support for interpolation, which is available in several SMT solvers.
Despite this multitude of adaptations of PDR to infinite-state systems, most
implementations in practice require their input to be encoded as transition sys-
tems already. The only available software verifiers that can be applied to actual
C programs and implement PDR-based techniques are CPAchecker [7], Sea-
Horn [23], and Vvt [21].
2 Background
In this section, we briefly introduce the algorithms PDR and k -induction, which
provide the core concepts on which we base our ideas. In the following description
of PDR and k -induction, we use the following notation: given the propositional
state variables s and s′ within a state-transition system T that represents the
program, predicate I(s) denotes that s is an initial state, T (s, s′) that a transition
from s to s′ exists, and P (s) that the safety property P holds for state s.
2.1 PDR
PDR maintains a list of k frames, where a frame Fi is a predicate that represents
an overapproximation of all states reachable within at most 0 ≤ i ≤ k steps, and
a queue of proof obligations, which guide invariant discovery towards invariants
2 The implementation of this approach of property-directed k -induction combines two
SMT solvers, because neither of them supports all features required by the technique.
relevant to prove the correctness of a safety property P . For a given state s, the
notation Fi(s) means that the predicate Fi holds for state s. The index i of a
frame Fi is called its level, and the frame Fk is called the frontier, because it
represents the largest overapproximation of reachable states computed by the
algorithm [13]. The algorithm maintains the following invariants:
1. F0(s) = I(s), i.e., the first frame represents precisely the initial states.
2. ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k} : Fi(s) ⇒ P (s), i.e., every frame contains only states that
satisfy the safety property.
3. ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1} : Fi(s)⇒ Fi+1(s), i.e., a frame Fi+1 represents in addition
such states that are reachable with i+ 1 steps.
4. ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : Fi(s) ∧ T (s, s
′)⇒ Fi+1(s
′), i.e., each frame is inductive
relative to its predecessor.
Using these data structures and algorithm invariants, the algorithm attempts to
find either a counterexample to P or a 1-inductive invariant Fi such that Fi(s)⇔
Fi+1(s) for some level i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}. Until either of these potential outcomes
is reached, PDR shifts back and forth between the following two phases:
1. If the set of states represented by the frontier Fk does not contain any pre-
decessor states of ¬P -states (i.e., ∀sj , sj+1 : Fk(sj)∧ T (sj, sj+1)⇒ P (sj+1),
called frontier-incrementation check), a new frontier Fk+1 is created and ini-
tialized to P . Subsequently, the algorithm attempts to push forward 3 each
clause c of each frame Fi with 0 ≤ i ≤ k for which the consecution check
Fi(sj) ∧ T (sj , sj+1) ⇒ c(sj+1) holds (see Fig. 2). If, on the other hand, the
frontier-incrementation check fails, PDR extracts a ¬P -predecessor t in Fk,
which represents a counterexample to induction (CTI), from the failed query
as proof obligation 〈t, k − 1〉 (see Fig. 3, top).
2. While the queue of proof obligations is not empty, PDR processes the queue
by trying to prove for each proof obligation 〈t, i〉 that the CTI-state t is
itself not reachable from Fi and therefore does not need to be considered as
a relevant ¬P -predecessor. For this proof, PDR chooses some clause c ⊆ ¬t
with ∀s : Fi(s) ⇒ c(s). PDR then checks if c is inductive relative to Fi by
performing the consecution check Fi(sj) ∧ c(sj) ∧ T (sj, sj+1)⇒ c(sj+1)). If
the consecution check succeeds, the frames F1, . . . , Fi+1 can be strengthened
by adding c, thus ruling out the CTI t in these frames for the future (see
Fig. 3, left). Also, unless i = k, we add a new proof obligation 〈t, i + 1〉
to the queue as an optimization to initiate forward propagation, because we
expect that the CTI-state s would otherwise be rediscovered later at a higher
level [12]. Otherwise, i.e., the consecution check does not succeed for clause c,
the algorithm extracts a predecessor u of t from the failed consecution check,
which is added as a new proof obligation 〈u, i − 1〉 if i > 0 and t ∧ I is
unsatisfiable (see Fig. 3, right). Otherwise, u represents the initial state of a
real counterexample to P .
A more detailed presentation of PDR can be found in the literature [13].
3 By “push forward”, we mean to add a clause c from frame Fi to frame Fi+1 [13].
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Fig. 2: Consecution check makes sure to only conjoin to frame Fi+1 such ci
from Fi that are inductive relative to Fi w.r.t. transition relation T
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Fig. 3: If phase 1 results in a proof obligation 〈t, k−1〉 (top), then phase 2 resolves
either by strengthening Fk with c (left), or by creating a new (backwards) proof
obligation 〈u, k− 2〉 (right); if the chain of proof obligations propagates back to
the initial states, then a feasible error path is found
Example. As an example, we will now show how PDR is applied to a veri-
fication task with
• the initial-state predicate I(s) = (xs = 2),
• the transition relation T (s, s′) = (xs′ = 2 · xs − 1), and
• the safety property P (s) = (xs > 0).
Initially, we therefore have two frames F0(s) = (xs = 2) and F1(s) = (xs > 0),
and k = 1, i.e., F1 is the frontier. The algorithm begins in phase 1, where we
check whether the frontier contains any predecessors of ¬P -states. We find such
a predecessor t with t = (xt = 0.5), because 2 · 0.5 − 1 = 0, which violates P .
From this CTI, we create the proof obligation 〈(xs = 0.5), 0〉, add it to our
queue of proof obligations, and switch to phase 2. In phase 2, we try to find
a clause c ⊆ ¬t with ∀s : F0(s) ⇒ c(s). We can find a valid clause c with
c(s) = (xs > 0.5) that represents a subset of ¬t-states and a superset of the
states represented by F0, because (x = 2)⇒ (x > 0.5)⇒ (x 6= 0.5), and add this
clause to frames F0 and F1, such that F0(s) = (xs = 2 ∧ xs > 0.5) and F1(s) =
(xs > 0∧ xs > 0.5), after which the algorithm switches back to phase 1. Back in
phase 1, we again check if the frontier, which is still F1, contains any predecessors
of ¬P -states, which it now no longer does. Hence, we create a new frontier F2
with F2(s) = (x > 0). Then, we attempt to push forward each clause of F0 and F1,
which succeeds for (xs > 0.5) in frame F0, which is already contained in F1, and
for (xs > 0.5) in frame F1, which we then add to F2. Thus, our frames are
now F0(s) = (xs = 2 ∧ xs > 0.5), F1(s) = (xs > 0 ∧ xs > 0.5), and F2(s) =
(xs > 0 ∧ xs > 0.5), which means that F1(s) ⇔ F2(s), i.e., frame F1 represents
an inductive invariant that implies P and therefore, the proof is complete.
2.2 k-Induction
Like PDR, k -induction attempts to prove a safety property P by applying induc-
tion. However, while PDR strengthens its induction hypothesis by using clauses
extracted from specific counterexamples to induction after failed induction at-
tempts, k -induction strengthens its induction hypothesis by increasing the length
of the unrolling of the transition relation:
Starting with an initial value for the bound k (usually 1), the k -induction
algorithm increases the value of k iteratively after each unsuccessful attempt
at finding a specification violation (base case), proving correctness via complete
loop unrolling (forward condition), or inductively proving correctness of the pro-
gram (inductive-step case).
Base Case. The base case of k -induction consists of running BMC with the
current bound k. 4 This means that starting from all initial program states, all
states of the program reachable within at most k−1 unwindings of the transition
relation are explored. If a ¬P -state is found, the algorithm terminates.
Forward Condition. If no ¬P -state is found by the BMC in the base case, the
algorithm continues by performing the forward-condition check, which attempts
to prove that BMC fully explored the state space of the program by checking
that no state with distance k′ > k − 1 to the initial state is reachable. If this
check is successful, the algorithm terminates.
4 We define the loop bound as the number of visits of the loop head, that is, with loop
bound k = 1, the loop head is visited once, but there was not yet any unwinding
of the loop body. This nicely matches the intuition for k-induction: 1-inductiveness
means that if the invariant holds for one state (without loop unrolling), then it holds
again after one loop unrolling in the successor state; k-inductiveness means that if
the invariant holds for k states (k− 1 loop unrollings), then it holds again after one
more loop unrolling in the successor state.
Inductive-Step Case. The forward-condition check, however, can only prove
safety for programs with finite (and, in practice, short) loops. To prove safety
beyond the bound k, the algorithm applies induction: The inductive-step case
attempts to prove that after every sequence of k unrollings of the transition re-
lation that did not reach a ¬P -state, there can also be no subsequent transition
into a ¬P -state by unwinding the transition relation once more. In the realm
of model checking of software, however, the safety property P is often not di-
rectly k-inductive for any value of k, thus causing the inductive-step-case check
to fail. It is therefore state-of-the-art practice to add auxiliary invariants to this
check to further strengthen the induction hypothesis and make it more likely
to succeed. Thus, the inductive-step case proves a program safe if the following
condition is unsatisfiable:
Inv(sn) ∧
n+k−1∧
i=n
(P (si) ∧ T (si, si+1)) ∧ ¬P (sn+k)
where Inv is an auxiliary invariant, and sn, . . . , sn+k is any sequence of states. If
this check fails, the induction attempt is inconclusive, and the program is neither
proved safe nor unsafe yet with the current value of k and the given auxiliary
invariant. In this case, the algorithm increases the value of k and starts over.
A detailed presentation of k -induction can be found in the literature [4, 5].
3 Combining k -Induction with PDR
Algorithm 1 shows an extension of k -induction with continuously-refined in-
variants [4] that applies PDR’s aspect of learning from counterexamples to induc-
tion and that can be applied both as a main proof engine as well as an invariant
generator. This allows us to apply this extension of k -induction as an invariant
generator to a main k -induction procedure, similar to the KI 	←−KI approach [4].
Inputs. The algorithm takes the following inputs: The value kinit is used to
initialize the unrolling bound k, whereas the function inc is used to increase k
in line 33 after each major iteration of the algorithm, up to an upper limit of k
defined by the value kmax enforced in line 3. The set of initial program states
is described by the predicate I, the possible state transitions are described
by the transition relation T , and the set of safe states is described by the
safety property P . The accessor get_currently_known_invariant is used to
obtain the strongest invariant currently available via a concurrently running
(external) auxiliary-invariant generator. A Boolean flag pd (reminding of
“property-directed”) is used to control whether or not failed induction checks
are used to guide the algorithm towards a sufficient strengthening of the
safety property P to prove correctness; if pd is set to false , the algorithm
behaves exactly like standard k -induction. Given a failed attempt to prove some
candidate invariant Q 5 by induction, the function lift is used to obtain from a
5 Depending on the step the algorithm is in, Q may be either the safety property P
or a proof obligation o.
Algorithm 1 Iterative-Deepening k -Induction with Property Direction
Input: the initial value kinit ≥ 1 for the bound k,
an upper limit kmax for the bound k,
a function inc : N→ N with ∀n ∈ N : inc(n) > n,
the initial states defined by the predicate I ,
the transfer relation defined by the predicate T ,
a safety property P ,
a function get_currently_known_invariant to obtain auxiliary invariants,
a Boolean pd that enables or disables property direction,
a function lift : N× (S → B)× (S → B)× S → (S → B), and
a function strengthen : N× (S → B)× (S → B)→ (S → B),
where S is the set of program states.
Output: true if P holds, false otherwise
Variables: the current bound k := kinit,
the invariant InternalInv := true computed by this algorithm internally, and
the set O := {} of current proof obligations.
1: while k ≤ kmax do
2: Oprev := O
3: O := {}
4: base_case := I(s0) ∧
k−1∨
n=0
(
n−1∧
i=0
T (si, si+1) ∧ ¬P (sn)
)
5: if sat(base_case) then
6: return false
7: forward_condition := I(s0) ∧
k−1∧
i=0
T (si, si+1)
8: if ¬ sat(forward_condition) then
9: return true
10: if pd then
11: for each o ∈ Oprev do
12: base_case
o
:= I(s0) ∧
k−1∨
n=0
(
n−1∧
i=0
T (si, si+1) ∧ ¬o(sn)
)
13: if sat(base_caseo ) then
14: return false
15: else
16: step_caseon :=
n+k−1∧
i=n
(o(si) ∧ T (si, si+1)) ∧ ¬o(sn+k)
17: ExternalInv := get_currently_known_invariant()
18: Inv := InternalInv ∧ ExternalInv
19: if sat(Inv(sn) ∧ step_caseon) then
20: so := satisfying predecessor state
21: O := O ∪ {¬lift(k, Inv , o, so)}
22: else
23: InternalInv := InternalInv ∧ strengthen(k, Inv , o)
24: step_case
n
:=
n+k−1∧
i=n
(P (si) ∧ T (si, si+1)) ∧ ¬P (sn+k)
25: ExternalInv := get_currently_known_invariant()
26: Inv := InternalInv ∧ ExternalInv
27: if sat(Inv(sn) ∧ step_casen) then
28: if pd then
29: s := satisfying predecessor state
30: O := O ∪ {¬lift(k, Inv , P, s)}
31: else
32: return true
33: k := inc(k)
34: return unknown
concrete counterexample-to-induction (CTI) state a set of CTI states described
by a state predicate C. An implementation of the function lift needs to satisfy
the condition that for a CTI s ∈ S where S is the set of program states, k ∈ N,
Inv ∈ (S → B), Q ∈ (S → B), and C = lift(k, Inv , Q, s), the following holds:
C(s)∧
(
∀sn ∈ S : C(sn) ⇒ Inv(sn)∧
n+k−1∧
i=n
(Q(si)∧T (si,si+1))⇒¬Q(sn+k)
)
,
which means that the CTI s must be an element of the set of states described by
the resulting predicate C and that all states in this set must be CTIs, i.e., they
need to be k-predecessors of ¬Q-states, or in other words, each state in the set of
states described by the predicate C must reach some ¬Q-state via k unrollings of
the transition relation T . We can implement lift using Craig interpolation [19, 32]
between A : s = sn and B : Inv(sn) ∧
n+k−1∧
i=n
(Q(si) ∧ T (si, si+1)) ⇒ ¬Q(sn+k),
because s is a CTI, and therefore we know that A⇒ B holds. 6 Hence, the result-
ing interpolant satisfies the criteria for C to be a valid lifting of s according to the
requirements towards the function lift as outlined above. The function strengthen
is used to obtain for a k-inductive invariant a stronger k-inductive invariant, i.e.,
its result needs to imply the input invariant, and, just like the input invariant,
it must not be violated within k loop iterations and must be k-inductive.
Algorithm. Lines 4 to 6 show the base-case check (BMC) and lines 7 to 9
show the forward-condition check, both as described in Sect. 2. If pd is set
to true, lines 10 to 23 attempt to prove each proof obligation using k -induction:
Lines 12 to 14 check the base case for a proof obligation o. If any violations of the
proof obligation o are found, this means that a predecessor state of a ¬P -state,
and thus, transitively, a ¬P -state, is reachable, so we return false . If, other-
wise, no violation was found, lines 16 to 23 check the inductive-step case to
prove o. 7 We strengthen the induction hypothesis of the step-case check by con-
joining auxiliary invariants from an external invariant generator (via a call to
get_currently_known_invariant) and the auxiliary invariant computed internally
from proof obligations that we successfully proved previously. If the step-case
check for o is unsuccessful, we extract the resulting CTI state, lift it to a set of
CTI states, and construct a new proof obligation so that we can later attempt to
prove that these CTI states are unreachable. If, on the other hand, the step-case
check for o is successful, we remove o from the set of unproven proof obligationsO
in line 22. We could now directly use the proof obligation as an invariant, but
instead, in line 23 we first try to strengthen it into a stronger invariant that
removes even more unreachable states from future consideration before conjoin-
ing it to our internally computed auxiliary invariant. In our implementation, we
6 The formula C is called Craig interpolant for two formulas A and B with A⇒ B, if
A⇒ C, C ⇒ B, and all variables in C occur in both A and B.
7 Note that we do not need to check the forward condition for proof obligations, be-
cause the forward condition is unrelated to the safety property and the proof obliga-
tions, and therefore only needs to be checked once in each major iteration (i.e., once
after each increment of k).
implement strengthen by attempting to drop components from a (disjunctive)
invariant and checking if the remaining clause is still inductive. In lines 24 to 32,
we check the inductive-step case for the safety property P . This check is mostly
analogous to the inductive-step case check for the proof obligations described
above, except that if the check is successful, we immediately return true.
Note that Alg. 1 eagerly increases k, even if the set O of proof obligations
is not empty. This heuristic prevents the PDR part from iterating through long
chains of proof obligations, it rather delegates the unrolling to the k-induction
part.
Example. We now give an example of applying Alg. 1 to the example in-
troduced in Fig. 1.8 For this example, we will configure the algorithm as a
property-directed invariant generator. We choose kinit = 1 as the initial bound
and kmax =∞ to force the algorithm to increase the bound k until a proof
is found or an alarm is raised, and thus, the condition in line 1 of Alg. 1
will always evaluate to true. To increment k by a value of 1 in each ma-
jor iteration, we define inc(k) = k + 1. The set of initial states and the trans-
fer relation are given by the input program eq2.c. As safety property P
we require that no call to the function __VERIFIER_error() is reachable.
We will not use an external auxiliary-invariant generator, hence we define
get_currently_known_invariant() = true. Instead, we want to use the algorithm’s
capability of property-directed invariant generation and set pd = true. The most
important steps and variable values at some algorithm locations are summarized
in Table 1.
In the first iteration, with k = 1, we first need to check the base case, i.e.,
we need to check in lines 4 to 6 of the algorithm whether the call to func-
tion __VERIFIER_error() in line 5 of the input program is reachable with
zero loop iterations. Since this is not the case, we continue to lines 7 to 9 of
the algorithm, where we check the forward condition, i.e., we check whether
we completely unrolled the loop, that is, not more than zero unrollings of the
loop are possible. Since the loop condition depends on a nondeterministic in-
put value, this check will always fail, and so we continue to line 10 of the al-
gorithm, where property-directed invariant generation begins, if it is switched
on. Because pd = true, we attempt to generate invariants from our set O of
proof obligations. This set, however, is currently empty, and so we jump to the
step-case check in lines 24 to 27 of the algorithm, where we assume for any
iteration n (k iterations from n to n + k − 1 = n) that the safety property
holds, and from this assumption attempt to conclude that the safety property
will also hold in the next iteration n+1 (n+ k). In the context of this example,
this means that we assume for any iteration n that we did not reach a call to
the function __VERIFIER_error(), and from this assumption try to conclude
that __VERIFIER_error() is also not reachable in the next iteration n+1. How-
8 For ease of presentation, we assume that I encodes the beginning of the program
(lines 10–13), T encodes the loop body (lines 15–16), and P encodes the rest of the
program (which checks the property to verify).
Table 1: Relevant steps and values within Alg. 1 if applied to the example intro-
duced in Fig. 1.
Major iteration 1 2
Line 1 k = 1 k = 2
Line 4 BMC finds no error in 0 itera-
tions
BMC finds no error in up to 1 it-
eration
Line 8 Forward-condition check fails Forward-condition check fails
Line 10 pd = true pd = true
Line 11 O = ∅ O = {y = z}, o = (y = z)
Line 13 BMC finds no counterexample
to y = z in up to 1 iteration
Line 17 ExternalInv = true
Line 18 InternalInv = true , Inv = true
Line 19 Step-case check for o succeeds,
because y = z is inductive
Line 22 O = ∅
Line 23 InternalInv = (y = z)
Line 25 ExternalInv = true ExternalInv = true
Line 26 InternalInv = true , Inv = true InternalInv = (y = z),
Inv = ((y = z))
Line 27 Step-case check fails Step-case check succeeds
Line 28 pd = true
Line 29 s = (y = 0 ∧ z = 1)
Line 30 O = {y = z}
Line 33 k = 2
ever, we have not yet computed any auxiliary invariants, so InternalInv = true
and we cannot obtain any invariants from an external invariant generator ei-
ther, because we defined get_currently_known_invariant() = true, therefore
also Inv = true in line 26. As described in the introduction, checking the
inductive-step case for the safety property P will always fail without auxil-
iary invariants for this example, because the SMT solver can provide a model
where y 6= z holds before this iteration, but after this iteration, the nondeter-
ministic loop condition evaluates to false and the safety property is violated. For
this example, we assume the SMT solver produces a model where before the iter-
ation, y = 0 and z = 1, and this state becomes our satisfying predecessor state s
in line 29 of the algorithm. Next, we try to lift this state to a more abstract state
that still satisfies the property that all of its successors violate the safety prop-
erty. For this example, we assume that lifting produces the abstract state y 6= z.
We then negate this abstract state to obtain the proof obligation y = z. This
means that we have learned that we should prove the invariant y = z, such that
in future induction checks, we can remove all states where y 6= z from the set
of predecessor states that need to be considered. Therefore, we add the proof
obligation to our set O of current proof obligations, such that O := {y = z}. We
then increment k using the function inc(k) = k + 1, and continue into the next
major iteration of our algorithm with k = 2.
Again, we check the base case in line 4, and again, the check succeeds, be-
cause we cannot reach a call to the function __VERIFIER_error() in line 5 of
the input program within one loop iteration either. As explained before, the
forward-condition check in line 8 of the algorithm must always fail for this input
program, and so we again continue with property-directed invariant generation.
This time, however, the set O of current proof obligations is not empty, and so we
choose from it in line 11 of the algorithm the only proof obligation o it currently
contains, y = z, and try to prove it by induction. Hence, we first check the proof-
obligation base case in lines 12 to 13 of the algorithm. Obviously, the check suc-
ceeds, because y = z holds before and after the first loop iteration of the program:
the two variables are both initialized to 0, and are both incremented once. We
still have not computed any auxiliary invariants yet, so InternalInv = true, and
we defined get_currently_known_invariant() = true, therefore also Inv = true in
line 18. This means that when we check the inductive-step case in line 19 of the
algorithm, we have no auxiliary invariants. Nevertheless, the check is successful,
because contrary to checking the safety property P , which concerns the reachabil-
ity of a function call outside the loop and therefore depends on the nondetermin-
istic loop condition, the condition that y = z before and after each loop iteration
does not depend on any nondeterministic input value. Thus, we remove y = z
from our set O of current proof obligations in line 22 of the algorithm. We then
try to strengthen y = z to obtain a stronger k-inductive (i.e., 2-inductive, since
currently k = 2) invariant for this program. However, since y = z is already a
quite strong invariant for this input program, we are unlikely to find a stronger
one easily. For this example, we therefore assume that this step strengthens the
invariant to y = z again. We then conjoin y = z to our current internally com-
puted invariant InternalInv , such that InternalInv = (y = z) in line 23 of the
algorithm. Next, we check the inductive-step case for the safety property P in
lines 24 to 27. This time, with Inv = (y = z), the check will succeed, and the
algorithm returns true in line 32.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we present an extensive experimental study on the effectiveness
and efficiency of adaptations of PDR to software verification.
4.1 Compared Approaches
We use the following abbreviations to distinguish between the different tech-
niques that we evaluated:
CTIGAR: CTIGAR [12] is an adaptation of PDR to software verification.
Our evaluation compares two implementations of CTIGAR, namely Vvt-
CTIGAR from the tool Vvt and our own implementation CPAchecker-
CTIGAR. Vvt [21] also provides a configuration that runs a parallel portfolio
combination of Vvt-CTIGAR and bounded model checking, which we call
Vvt-Portfolio.
KI: KI [4] denotes the plain k -induction algorithm without property direction
and without auxiliary invariants, i.e., we configure Alg. 1 such that pd = false
and get_currently_known_invariant() always returns true.
KIPDR: KIPDR denotes a configuration of Alg. 1 such that pd = true
and get_currently_known_invariant() always returns true, i.e., k -induction
with property direction but without additional auxiliary-invariant generation.
KIPDR is, like CTIGAR, an adaptation of PDR to software verification.
KI 	←−DF: KI 	←−DF [4] denotes a parallel combination of k -induction (without
property direction) with a data-flow-based auxiliary-invariant generator that
continuously supplies the k -induction procedure with invariants. Here, we con-
figure Alg. 1 such that pd = false and get_currently_known_invariant() always
returns the most recent (strongest) invariant computed by the data-flow-based
auxiliary-invariant generator.
KI 	←−KIPDR: Similarly to KI 	←−DF, KI 	←−KIPDR denotes a parallel com-
bination of k -induction with an auxiliary-invariant generator — in this case,
KIPDR — that continuously supplies invariants to the k -induction proce-
dure. Here, we configure one instance of Alg. 1 such that pd = false and
get_currently_known_invariant() always returns the most recent (strongest)
invariant computed by KIPDR (a second instance of Alg. 1 that is config-
ured such that pd = true and get_currently_known_invariant() always re-
turns true).
KI 	←−DF;KIPDR KI 	←−DF;KIPDR denotes a parallel combination of
k -induction with an auxiliary-invariant generator that uses a sequential com-
bination of a data-flow-based invariant generator and KIPDR to continuously
supply k -induction with auxiliary invariants. Here, we configure one instance
of Alg. 1 such that pd = false and get_currently_known_invariant() always
returns the most recent (strongest) invariant computed by a sequential com-
bination of the data-flow-based invariant generator and KIPDR (a second in-
stance of Alg. 1 that runs after the data-flow-based invariant generator finishes
and is configured such that pd = true and get_currently_known_invariant()
always returns true).
We do not evaluate the used invariant generators as standalone verification ap-
proaches, because they are designed specifically to be used as auxiliary compo-
nents and do not perform well enough in isolation. For example, data-flow based
invariant-generation approaches are often too imprecise to verify tasks by them-
selves, whereas more precise techniques like KIPDR might spend too much time
unnecessarily, resulting in too many timeouts to be competitive. Instead, we
use the framework of k -induction with continuously refined invariant generation,
which has been shown to be able to leverage the advantages of both quick but
imprecise and slow but precise techniques [4].
4.2 Evaluation Goals
The overall goals of our experimental evaluation are to establish a baseline for
experimental comparisons involving PDR in the context of software verification
and to determine whether we can combine the strengths of PDR with those of
k -induction. We are interested in answers to the following research hypotheses.
We use the symbols ✓ and ✗ to indicate that a hypothesis will be confirmed or
refuted, respectively, by our experiments on the given benchmark sets.
Hypothesis 1: CPAchecker is a suitable platform for implementing and eval-
uating PDR-based techniques. That is, we are able to implement state-of-the-
art PDR techniques in this framework and obtain competitive results. ✓
Hypothesis 2: By providing k -induction with a KIPDR invariant generator,
which utilizes the PDR-aspect of guiding invariant discovery by leverag-
ing failed induction attempts, we can improve the overall effectiveness of
k -induction. ✗
Hypothesis 3: On small programs, such as path programs, KIPDR is a more
effective invariant generator than data-flow-based techniques and is therefore
well-suited for the approach of generating path invariants [6]. ✗
Hypothesis 4: While KIPDR is often outperformed by simpler, data-flow-
based invariant-generation techniques, there exist programs that can not be
solved using the considered data-flow-based invariant-generation techniques,
but can be solved using KIPDR as auxiliary-invariant generator. Furthermore,
KI 	←−KIPDR can be more efficient than state-of-the-art verifiers from the SV-
COMP evaluation. ✓
Hypothesis 5: Our conclusions are relevant, because our implementation of
KI 	←−DF;KIPDR is competitive when compared to the best available imple-
mentations of PDR technology for software verification. ✓
4.3 Benchmark Set
The benchmark set we use in our experiments consists of verification tasks from
the International Competition on Software Verification (SV-COMP) [9], in partic-
ular, we use the benchmark categories as used for SV-COMP 2018 9. In addition,
we use a set of new verification tasks, which are (a) generated path programs
from existing verification tasks, in order to obtain verification tasks that are
small enough for the PDR approach to handle, and (b) manually created pro-
grams that explore the expressive power of the PDR approach. All programs that
were used in the evaluations are available on the supplementary web page 10 and
in the replication package [10].
We consider only verification tasks where the property to verify is the un-
reachability of a program location (excluding the properties for no-overflows,
memory safety, and termination, which are not in the scope of our evalua-
tion). From the resulting set of verification tasks, we excluded the categories
ReachSafety-Recursive and ConcurrencySafety, each of which is not supported
by at least one of the evaluated implementations. The remaining set of cat-
egories consists of a total of 5 591 verification tasks from the subcategory
9
https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2018/benchmarks.php
10
https://www.sosy-lab.org/research/pdr-compare/
DeviceDriversLinux64_ReachSafety of the category SoftwareSystems and from
the following subcategories of the category ReachSafety: Arrays, Bitvectors, Con-
trolFlow, ECA, Floats, Heap, Loops, ProductLines, and Sequentialized. A total of
1 457 of these tasks are known to contain a specification violation, while the rest
of the tasks are meant to satisfy their specification.
4.4 Verification Tools and Algorithms
We evaluate all verification tools that are (1) publicly available, (2) support
C as an input-program language, and (3) implement at least one PDR-based
approach. There are three such verifiers available: We use CPAchecker [7] in
revision 27 742 from the trunk, SeaHorn [23] in version F16-0.1.0-rc3, and
the Vvt version used in the 2016 Competition on Software Verification (SV-
COMP 2016) [21]. 11
For implementing our own modules and extensions, we choose the framework
CPAchecker, because it (a) is a large open-source project that “has a well
established, mature codebase maintained by a large development team” 12, and
(b) seems to have efficient implementations of the core components 13.
Unfortunately, we could include neither the implementations of Cimatti and
Grigio [16], nor that of Lange, Prinz, Neuhäußer, Noll, and Katoen [30, 31], in our
evaluation. The former are only applicable to transition systems in SMT format
and control-flow graphs in SMTCFA format, respectively, not to C programs,
and the latter is not publicly available.
4.5 Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we executed the chosen software verifiers on machines with
one 3.4GHz CPU (Intel Xeon E3-1230 v5) with 8 processing units and 33GB
of RAM each. The operating system was Ubuntu 16.04 (64 bit), using Linux 4.4
and OpenJDK 1.8. We limited each verification run to two CPU cores, a CPU
run time of 15min, and a memory usage of 15GB. To ensure reliable and ac-
curate measurements, we used the benchmarking framework BenchExec14 [8]
to conduct our experiments.
4.6 Presentation
All benchmarks, tools, and the full results of our evaluation are available on a
supplementary web page 15 and in the replication package [10]. All reported times
are rounded to two significant digits. Because it is sometimes difficult to compare
11 We could not use the newer version of Vvt from GitHub, because it has a bug where
its CTIGAR component does not report solved tasks and no fix was available.
12 Citation source: https://www.openhub.net/p/cpachecker
13 SV-COMP 2018: https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2018/results/results-verified/
14
https://github.com/sosy-lab/benchexec
15
https://www.sosy-lab.org/research/pdr-compare/
results in the presence of wrong alarms or wrong proofs, we use the community-
agreed schema of SV-COMP to assign quality values to each verification result,
i.e., to calculate a score that quantifies the quality of the results for a verifier. For
every real bug found, 1 point is assigned, for every correct safety proof, 2 points
are assigned. A score of 16 points is subtracted for every wrong alarm (false
positive) reported by the tool, and 32 points are subtracted for every wrong
proof of safety (false negative). While this scoring scheme may not match every
use case, it is not arbitrary: it follows a community consensus [9] on the difficulty
of verification versus falsification and the importance of correct results, where
proving correctness (computing invariants) is considered more complicated than
finding bugs (computing error paths), and wrong answers are punished severely
(by a factor of 16). We consider this a good fit for evaluating approaches such
as k -induction and PDR, which focus on producing safety proofs.
4.7 Hypothesis 1: Suitability of CPAchecker for PDR
In our first set of experiments, we establish that the CPAchecker framework
is a suitable platform for implementing PDR-based techniques by comparing
the effectiveness and efficiency of our own implementation of PDR for software-
model checking (CPAchecker-CTIGAR) to the only available verifier that im-
plements a pure PDR approach for software-model checking, which is Vvt-
CTIGAR [12].16 The implementation in Vvt has been published previously [21],
whereas the implementation in CPAchecker was newly developed for this arti-
cle to serve as a baseline to compare further implementations of adaptations of
PDR in CPAchecker against. Columns two and three of Table 2 compare the
results obtained by running the two implementations of CTIGAR on the whole
benchmark set, and the last column of the table shows the results achieved with
the standard configuration of Vvt, which runs not only CTIGAR, but a portfo-
lio analysis of CTIGAR and bounded model checking. The table lists the score
achieved by each configuration and breaks it down into the amount of correct
and incorrect proofs and alarms. It also lists for how many tasks a configuration
exceeded the time limit of 15min or the memory limit of 15GB, as well as the
amount of tasks a tool configuration could not solve for other reasons, such as
failures in the parser, the SMT solver, or the analysis. Furthermore, the table
lists the total, mean, and median CPU and wall times spent by a configura-
tion. We observe that while CPAchecker-CTIGAR is more effective (i.e., solves
more tasks correctly) and has fewer wrong results than Vvt-CTIGAR, Vvt ap-
pears to be more efficient (i.e., is faster). We attribute the overall differences
between the tools regarding correctly and incorrectly solved tasks to the fact
that CPAchecker as a framework is older and more mature than Vvt. In fact,
we see many cases where Vvt fails to parse the C code of a task, likely due to
limited support for some features of the C programming language. We also see
16 We chose the direct comparison with Vvt over a comparison with SeaHorn here,
because CPAchecker-CTIGAR uses the same approach as Vvt-CTIGAR, and because
of the large number of incorrect results for SeaHorn.
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Fig. 4: Quantile plot for accumulated number of solved tasks (proofs and alarms)
showing the CPU time (linear scale below 1 s, logarithmic above) for the success-
ful results of CPAchecker-CTIGAR and Vvt-CTIGAR
that only few real bugs are detected by CPAchecker-CTIGAR (255) and Vvt-
CTIGAR (215), while the Vvt portfolio analysis produces significantly more
correct alarms (311). This confirms our expectations, because PDR is mainly
aimed at computing invariants (and thus finding proofs), whereas bounded model
checking is well-known as a good technique for finding bugs. When considering
the union of tasks solved by CPAchecker-CTIGAR and Vvt-CTIGAR, i.e.,
the tasks solved by either CPAchecker-CTIGAR, Vvt-CTIGAR, or both (“vir-
tual best”), we find 1 474 tasks solved correctly, 1 124 of which constitute proofs,
and 350 of which constitute alarms. This means that on the one hand, for a
large amount of tasks, CPAchecker-CTIGAR and Vvt-CTIGAR both produce
the same correct results, but on the other hand, there are not only many tasks
CPAchecker-CTIGAR can solve correctly that Vvt-CTIGAR cannot solve, but
also several tasks that Vvt-CTIGAR can solve but CPAchecker-CTIGAR can-
not. Like the differences in the amounts of incorrect results, we can attribute
this observation to the way the different frameworks model the tasks internally,
where for some types of tasks, CPAchecker takes a safer approach to the trade-
off between correctness and effectiveness than Vvt, and where some language
constructs supported by the older CPAchecker framework are not supported
by the younger Vvt.
Table 2: Results for all 5 591 verification tasks, 1 457 of which contain bugs, while
the other 4 134 are considered to be safe, for the two CTIGAR implementations
CPAchecker-CTIGAR and Vvt-CTIGAR, for a theoretical “virtual best” com-
bination of both CTIGAR implementations where an oracle selects the best
implementation for each task, for k -induction without auxiliary invariants (KI),
and for the best configurations of each tool: CPAchecker’s KI 	←−DF;KIPDR,
SeaHorn, and Vvt as a portfolio verifier.
Verifier
CTIGAR
KI
Best of each tool
CPAchecker Vvt
Virt.
Best
KI 	←−DF;
KIPDR
SeaHorn
Vvt -
Portfolio
Score 1 903 879 2 598 3 282 5 398 2 848 727
Correct results 1 087 739 1 474 2 075 3 095 3 468 839
Correct proofs 832 524 1 124 1 239 2 335 2 724 528
Correct alarms 255 215 350 836 760 744 311
Wrong proofs 0 5 0 0 0 46 9
Wrong alarms 1 14 0 2 2 117 22
Timeouts 3 982 110 117 2 764 2 006 1 476 524
Out of memory 23 28 27 315 243 231 22
Other inconclusive 498 4 695 3 973 435 245 253 4 175
Times for correct results
Total CPU Time (h) 9.0 3.2 10 30 54 29 5.7
Mean CPU Time (s) 30 16 25 52 63 31 25
Median CPU Time (s) 4.9 0.24 3.8 9.8 10 0.89 0.45
Total Wall Time (h) 7.9 3.0 9.0 26 29 22 4.3
Mean Wall Time (s) 26 14 22 46 33 22 19
Median Wall Time (s) 2.6 0.18 2.2 5.3 5.4 0.50 0.25
To further analyze the efficiency of CPAchecker-CTIGAR and Vvt-
CTIGAR, the quantile plot in Fig. 4 shows the CPU times that the two tool
configurations spent on their correct results. The plot shows that for both tools,
there exist approximately 610 tasks for which each of the tasks can be solved in
less than approximately 5.2 s, and that in this range, Vvt is significantly faster
than CPAchecker, which can partially be explained by the approximately 3 s
startup time of the Java Virtual Machine that CPAchecker runs in. Beyond
that point, however, CPAchecker-CTIGAR scales better than Vvt-CTIGAR.
In conclusion, our implementation was shown to be at least as good as (and
even better than) the only available implementation of PDR for software model
checking. Therefore, the hypothesis that CPAchecker is a suitable platform for
implementing and evaluating adaptations of PDR holds. ✓
4.8 Hypothesis 2: Augmenting k-Induction with KIPDR
We now attempt to establish that augmenting k -induction with auxiliary invari-
ants from KIPDR improves its overall effectiveness: In the previous experiment,
we presented CPAchecker-CTIGAR, which uses an adaptation of PDR as its
verification engine. When we compare the results of CPAchecker-CTIGAR from
Table 2 to the results from evaluations [4, 5] of other techniques for previous ver-
sions of the same benchmark set, we see that neither of the two CTIGAR imple-
mentations is competitive. For example, running the k -induction configuration
of CPAchecker without auxiliary-invariant generation on our benchmark set,
we obtain 1 239 correct proofs and 836 correct alarms, as shown in the fourth
column of Table 2 (KI).
In general, however, the strength of PDR is considered to be its capability
for generating safety invariants, so that it is more interesting to analyze its
usefulness as an invariant generator.
For our second experiment, in which we solely compare configurations
of CPAchecker to minimize confounding effects, we therefore first took
all 2 893 tasks in our benchmark set that do not contain bugs and cannot be
solved by k -induction without an auxiliary-invariant generator, i.e., all tasks
where k -induction might potentially benefit from auxiliary invariants. On this
set of tasks, we ran three configurations of k -induction with auxiliary-invariant
generation: KI 	←−KIPDR uses the property-directed extension of k -induction
described in Sect. 3 as an auxiliary-invariant generator to a main k -induction
procedure, KI 	←−DF uses a sequential combination of several data-flow analy-
ses to generate auxiliary invariants, and KI 	←−DF;KIPDR combines the invari-
ant generators of the previous two. Table 3 shows that for KI 	←−KIPDR the
property-directed invariant-generation component KIPDR helps k -induction to
find proofs for 449 tasks that it could not solve without auxiliary invariants.
However, KI 	←−DF is much more efficient and effective, and the combination of
the two invariant generators provided by KI 	←−DF;KIPDR does not contribute
a significant improvement. The corresponding quantile plot in Fig. 5 suggests
that KIPDR is slower than KI 	←−DF (also compare the median CPU time), and
the fact that the graph of KI 	←−DF;KIPDR mostly overlaps with the graph
of KI 	←−DF suggests that there are only very few cases for which the behav-
ior of the two configurations differs. Therefore, on the currently available large
benchmark set, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 2, which states that the invari-
ant generator KIPDR helps us improve the effectiveness of k -induction beyond
the current state of the art; rather the null hypothesis holds, which states that
there is no significant difference (only two more solved instances, which is not
a significant improvement). ✗
4.9 Hypothesis 3: KIPDR as a Path-Invariant Generator
While refuting Hypothesis 2, we learned that KIPDR is a less efficient and ef-
fective invariant generator than data-flow-based techniques on our set of bench-
marks. One explanation may be that KIPDR is too expensive to generate invari-
ants for whole programs within the time limit. There exists research, however,
that suggests that one solution for applying expensive invariant-generation tech-
niques is to extract a (smaller) so-called path program from the (larger) original
program, apply the expensive techniques to the path program instead, and then
transfer the path invariants computed for the path program back to the analysis
that attempts to solve the original verification task [6].
Table 3: Results of k -induction-based configurations in CPAchecker with differ-
ent approaches for generating auxiliary invariants for all 2 893 verification tasks
that do not contain bugs and are not solved by k -induction without auxiliary
invariants.
Approach KI 	←−KIPDR KI 	←−DF KI 	←−DF;KIPDR
Correct proofs 449 1 117 1 119
Timeouts 1 982 1 529 1 503
Out of memory 143 98 106
Other inconclusive 319 149 165
Times for correct results
Total CPU Time (h) 3.6 21 21
Mean CPU Time (s) 29 68 68
Median CPU Time (s) 12 7.9 8.0
Total Wall Time (h) 2.0 11 11
Mean Wall Time (s) 16 35 36
Median Wall Time (s) 6.4 4.2 4.2
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Fig. 5: Quantile plot of accumulated number of bug-free tasks proved correctly
by different approaches for generating auxiliary invariants but not solved by
k -induction without auxiliary invariants
To determine if this approach provides a more suitable setting for KIPDR,
we extract from our original benchmark set 1 167 path programs for which we
are confident that they do not contain bugs. Then, we take the same approach
as in the previous experiment, i.e., we exclude all 1 053 path programs that can
be solved by k -induction without auxiliary invariants, and on the remaining 114
tasks, we run KI 	←−KIPDR, KI 	←−DF, and KI 	←−DF;KIPDR.
Table 4: Results of k -induction-based configurations in CPAchecker with differ-
ent approaches for generating auxiliary invariants for all 114 path programs that
we assume do not contain bugs and that are not solved by k -induction without
auxiliary invariants.
Approach KI 	←−KIPDR KI 	←−DF KI 	←−DF;KIPDR
Correct proofs 10 99 100
Timeouts 92 14 13
Out of memory 0 0 0
Other inconclusive 12 1 1
Times for correct results
Total CPU Time (h) 0.12 3.2 3.4
Mean CPU Time (s) 44 110 120
Median CPU Time (s) 5.4 26 27
Total Wall Time (h) 0.063 1.7 1.9
Mean Wall Time (s) 23 64 69
Median Wall Time (s) 2.9 13 14
Table 4 shows the results of this experiment. We observe again that
KI 	←−KIPDR is the least effective configuration, making KIPDR an ineffective
invariant generator even for this simplified set of tasks comprised of path pro-
grams. Therefore, we consider Hypothesis 3 as refuted on the given benchmark
set of path programs: There is no evidence to suggest that KIPDR is an effective
path-invariant generator compared to state-of-the-art techniques (only one more
solved instance, which is not a significant improvement). ✗
4.10 Hypothesis 4: KIPDR versus Data-Flow Techniques
Now we show that the higher efficiency of data-flow-based techniques is most
likely due to the simple form of the invariants needed to prove the programs
correct. This explains why the conceptually more advanced KIPDR is outper-
formed by the data-flow-based techniques.
For this experiment, we selected from the previous set of benchmarks
those 449 tasks that were solved by KI 	←−KIPDR and analyzed them us-
ing specific components of the sequential combination of data-flow analyses
used in KI 	←−DF. Specifically, we used one configuration that uses the ab-
stract domain of Boxes [22], one configuration using Boxes and the tem-
plate Eq := (x = y), and one configuration using Boxes, the template Eq, and
the template Mod2 := (|x| % 2 = c) with x, y ∈ X , where X is the set of pro-
gram variables, and c ∈ 0, 1.
The results are reported in Table 5. The first configuration, Boxes, is
already sufficient to verify 437 of the 449 tasks verified by KI 	←−KIPDR. Of
the remaining 12 tasks, 2 can be verified using a combination of Boxes and
Table 5: Results of four k -induction-based configurations in CPAchecker with
different approaches for generating auxiliary invariants for all 449 verification
tasks that do not contain bugs and are not solved by k -induction without auxil-
iary invariants, but are solved by KI 	←−KIPDR.
Approach
KI←DF
KI 	←−KIPDR
Boxes
Boxes,
Eq
Boxes,
Eq,
Mod2
Correct proofs 437 438 441 449
Timeouts 10 10 7 0
Out of memory 1 1 1 0
Times for correct results
Total CPU Time (h) 0.81 0.88 0.88 3.6
Mean CPU Time (s) 6.7 7.2 7.2 29
Median CPU Time (s) 5.9 6.0 6.0 12
Total Wall Time (h) 0.43 0.46 0.46 2.0
Mean Wall Time (s) 3.5 3.8 3.8 16
Median Wall Time (s) 3.1 3.2 3.2 6.4
Eq as an invariant generator. 17 Of the 10 tasks that are then left, another 3
can be verified when adding the Mod2 template to the combination. The
flexibility of KI 	←−KIPDR allows for another 7 tasks to be solved: For two of
these tasks, namely functions_true-unreach-call1_true-termination.i
and phases_true-unreach-call1.i, the key is still tracking whether vari-
ables are even or odd, but the control flow is too complex for our simple
data-flow analysis to succeed; the task ddlm2013_true-unreach-call.i
requires the disjunctive invariant a = b ∨ flag = 0; for
module_get_put-drivers-net-pppox_false-termination.ko_true-unreach-
call.cil.out.i.pp.i, KI 	←−KIPDR succeeds by first proving the auxiliary
invariant ldv_module_refcounter > 0 and then subsequently proving the
stronger invariant ldv_module_refcounter = 1, which in turn is a suffi-
ciently strong auxiliary invariant to solve the task; for each of the remaining
three, namely s3_srvr_1_true-unreach-call_false-termination.cil.c,
s3_srvr_2_true-unreach-call_false-termination.cil.c, and
s3_srvr_8_true-unreach-call_false-termination.cil.c, KI 	←−KIPDR
constructs multiple large disjunctive invariants that are too complex to manually
dissect, but each of which constrains the state space, such that together, they
suffice as an auxiliary invariant to solve the corresponding task.
The simple data-flow-based techniques, however, are much more efficient (see
CPU times). This explains why over the whole set of benchmarks, which appar-
ently contains many tasks for which simple invariants are sufficient, the data-flow
based techniques are more successful.
17 However, due to the higher precision after adding the Eq template, there is also a
task that is no longer solved, thus, the total number of proofs increases only by one.
Table 6: Results of four k -induction-based configurations in CPAchecker with
different approaches for generating auxiliary invariants for seven manually
crafted verification tasks that do not contain bugs and are not solved by
k -induction without auxiliary invariants; an entry “T” means that the CPU-time
limit was exceeded, an entry “M” means that the memory limit was exceeded,
and all other entries represent the CPU time a configuration spent to correctly
solve the task
Task Fig.
KI←DF
KI 	←−KIPDR
Boxes
Boxes,
Eq
Boxes,
Eq,
Mod2
const.c 6 3.3 s 3.3 s 3.2 s 3.8 s
eq1.c 7 T 3.2 s 3.3 s 4.9 s
eq2.c 1 M M M 3.9 s
even.c 8 T T 3.5 s 3.9 s
odd.c 9 T T 3.4 s 4.1 s
mod4.c 10 T T T 3.6 s
bin-suffix-5.c 11 M M M 3.6 s
9 int main(void) {
10 unsigned int s = 0;
11 while (__VERIFIER_nondet_uint()) {
12 if (s != 0) {
13 ++s;
14 }
15 if (__VERIFIER_nondet_uint()) {
16 __VERIFIER_assert(s == 0);
17 }
18 }
19 return 0;
20 }
Fig. 6: Program const.c
To further explore the differences between the approaches regarding their
expressive power, we manually created seven additional verification tasks that
outline the strengths and weaknesses of the configurations discussed above. We
list all discussed example programs as figures in this section, except for eq2.c,
which is already listed in Fig. 1. We do not repeat lines 1 to 9, because they
are the same as in Fig. 1 for all example programs. Table 6 shows the results
we obtained for these tasks. All configurations were able to prove safety for
the task const.c (Fig. 6), which was crafted such that it is sufficient to detect
the invariant s = 0. The task eq1.c shown in Fig. 7 requires the invariant
generators to compute the invariant w = x ∧ y = z, for which the abstract
domain of Boxes is not strong enough by itself, but which is trivial for the
configurations using the Eq template and for KIPDR. The task eq2.c shown
in Fig. 1, which has already been discussed as an example in the introduction,
9 int main(void) {
10 unsigned int w = __VERIFIER_nondet_uint();
11 unsigned int x = w;
12 unsigned int y = __VERIFIER_nondet_uint();
13 unsigned int z = y;
14 while (__VERIFIER_nondet_uint()) {
15 if (__VERIFIER_nondet_uint()) {
16 ++w; ++x;
17 } else {
18 −−y; −−z;
19 }
20 }
21 __VERIFIER_assert(w == x && y == z);
22 return 0;
23 }
Fig. 7: Program eq1.c
9 int main(void) {
10 unsigned int x = 0;
11 while (__VERIFIER_nondet_int()) {
12 x += 2;
13 }
14 __VERIFIER_assert(!(x % 2));
15 return 0;
16 }
Fig. 8: Program even.c
requires a similarly simple equality invariant, y = z, but the only way to prove
it is to first prove that at least initially, x = w ∧ y = (w+1)∧ z = (x+1) holds,
for which the simple abstract domains are too weak, but which is once again
easy for KIPDR. The tasks even.c (Fig. 8) and odd.c (Fig. 9) were specifically
designed to be solved only using invariant generators that could provide the
invariants |x| % 2 = 0 and |x| % 2 = 1, respectively, so it is not surprising
that of the configurations using data-flow-based invariant generators only the
one using the Mod2-template was able to solve the task. The task mod4.c shown
in Fig. 10, however, while being a simple adaptation of even.c that requires the
invariant |x| % 4 = 0, is only solved by KIPDR, as is the task bin-suffix-5.c
shown in Fig. 11, which requires an invariant (x & 5) = 5 where ’&’ is the binary
AND operator: While these last two tasks are conceptually not more difficult to
solve than the tasks that are solved using templates, each of them would require
a new template to be specified (and implemented), whereas the flexibility of
KIPDR allows the invariant generator to discover the invariant without any
help. This shows that while a fitting data-flow-based invariant generator may
be efficient if it is available, KIPDR is generally more powerful, because it does
not require specific templates.
The conclusion of our study on hand-crafted verification tasks is that there
are programs for which KIPDR is the superior technique, and that one of the
following assumptions might be true: (a) the large benchmark set from the sv-
benchmarks repository is not diverse enough to represent situations that occur
9 int main(void) {
10 unsigned int x = 1;
11 while (__VERIFIER_nondet_int()) {
12 x += 2;
13 }
14 __VERIFIER_assert(x % 2);
15 return 0;
16 }
Fig. 9: Program odd.c
9 int main(void) {
10 unsigned int x = 0;
11 while (__VERIFIER_nondet_int()) {
12 x += 4;
13 }
14 __VERIFIER_assert(!(x % 4));
15 return 0;
16 }
Fig. 10: Program mod4.c
in practice, or, (b) the vast majority of programs needs only ‘simple’ invariants
(that can be constructed using data-flow techniques).
On the chosen benchmark set, our experiments support the hypothesis that
KIPDR can be very strong and efficient on tasks that other approaches can not
solve (tasks with ‘interesting’ invariants). It is important to note that this is
an ‘exists’ statement and can not be generalized, as shown by the results that
KIPDR is often outperformed by simpler, data-flow-based invariant-generation
techniques. ✓
Further Discussion. The seven example programs 18 were added to the bench-
mark collection that was also used for SV-COMP 2019, and thus, results are
available for all verifiers that participated in the competition 19. Table 7 summa-
rizes the results of the best six verifiers in comparison with the KI 	←−KIPDR
approach that we created for the study in this paper. Those verifiers are, in
alphabetical order, Skink, Ultimate Automizer, Ultimate Kojak, Ultimate
Taipan, VeriAbs, and VIAP. Please note that the results of those six verifiers
were obtained in a slightly different environment than the one for the evaluations
we performed in this paper, because while the same hardware configuration was
used for both sets of results, the operating-system version used in SV-COMP 2019
was Ubuntu 18.04 based on Linux 4.15.
As should be expected, we observe that there are several approaches other
than KI 	←−KIPDR that can also solve the tasks we crafted. For example, be-
cause each loop in our seven manually crafted examples can be replaced by a
single linear-arithmetic computation, VeriAbs is able to apply loop-acceleration
to solve the tasks. We also looked into the reasons why Ultimate Automizer,
18
https://github.com/sosy-lab/sv-benchmarks/tree/svcomp19/c/loop-invariants/
19 See the last seven rows in this table: https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2019/results/results-verified/ReachSafety-Loops.table.html
9 int main(void) {
10 unsigned int x = 5;
11 while (__VERIFIER_nondet_int()) {
12 x += 8;
13 }
14 __VERIFIER_assert((x & 5) == 5);
15 return 0;
16 }
Fig. 11: Program bin-suffix-5.c
Table 7: Results of SV-COMP 2019 for the six verifiers that performed best
on our seven manually crafted verification tasks, compared to the results of
KI 	←−KIPDR approach previously shown in Table 6; an entry “T” means that
the CPU-time limit was exceeded, an entry “M” means that the memory limit
was exceeded, an entry “O” means that the verifier gave up deliberately for other
reasons, and all other entries represent the CPU time a verifier configuration
spent to correctly solve the task; note that SV-COMP 2019 used Ubuntu 18.04
based on Linux 4.15, whereas our evaluation of KI 	←−KIPDR used Ubuntu 16.04
based on Linux 4.4; otherwise, the evaluation environment was the same
Task
SV-COMP 2019
KI 	←−KIPDR
Skink UAutomizer UKojak UTaipan VeriAbs VIAP
const.c 4.2 s 8.7 s 9.1 s 8.2 s 13 s 110 s 3.8 s
eq1.c 290 s 7.8 s 7.6 s 8.3 s 14 s 57 s 4.9 s
eq2.c 4.1 s 8.1 s 8.6 s 7.6 s 14 s 4.7 s 3.9 s
even.c 3.7 s 7.4 s 8.2 s 8.6 s 140 s 4.5 s 3.9 s
odd.c O 9.6 s T 11 s 140 s 4.6 s 4.1 s
mod4.c 4.0 s 8.4 s 8.4 s 7.7 s 140 s 4.5 s 3.6 s
bin-suffix-5.c O 14 s T 13 s 13 s 4.7 s 3.6 s
which uses automata-based trace abstraction [25]. Interestingly, Ultimate Au-
tomizer, which uses the SMT solver Z3, can solve all seven tasks, a reimplemen-
tation of the same algorithm in CPAchecker can also solve them if configured
to use Z3, but the same implementation cannot solve them using MathSAT5,
because no suitable interpolants are generated, i.e., in the case of Ultimate
Automizer, the results appear to be related more to the choice of SMT solver
rather than the algorithm itself. 20 While we already know from our previous
experiments that in general, data-flow analyses can be very efficient invariant
generators, this comparison between KI 	←−KIPDR and the best verifiers from
SV-COMP 2019 reconfirms our observation from Table 6 that there are tasks
where other approaches are necessary and available, and that one such approach
is KI 	←−KIPDR, which performs at least as good as the best available verifiers
for all seven examples, in some cases even significantly better.
20 A thorough evaluation of the impact of the choice of the SMT solver, and the used
theory, on verification results was done by Wendler [35].
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Fig. 12: Quantile plot for accumulated score of solved tasks (offset to the left by
total penalty from wrong results) showing the CPU time (linear scale below 1 s,
logarithmic above) for the successful results of KI 	←−DF;KIPDR, SeaHorn, and
Vvt-Portfolio
The results for Hypotheses 2 and 3 suggested to reconfirm the insight by
Cimatti and Griggio that PDR is most effective if only applied as a fall-back
engine for cases where a cheaper interpolation engine fails to produce useful
interpolants [16]. The results of Table 7 draw a more optimistic picture.
4.11 Hypothesis 5: Relevancy
To conclude our evaluation, we establish the relevancy of our previous conclusions
by showing that the best of our configurations that use PDR is competitive
when compared to the best available tool implementations of adaptations of
PDR to software verification, and by comparing KI 	←−KIPDR against the best
verifiers in the subcategory ReachSafety-Loops from SV-COMP 2019, a category
that is well known to contain many tasks that require effort to be spent on
generating loop invariants.
Comparison against PDR-Based Verification Tools. The last three
columns of Table 2 give an overview over the best configurations of three dif-
ferent software verifiers that use adaptations of PDR: For CPAchecker, we
selected KI 	←−DF;KIPDR. For SeaHorn, we used the same configuration as
submitted by the developers to the 2016 Competition on Software Verification
(SV-COMP 2016) [24]. For Vvt, we used the portfolio configuration. We observe
that SeaHorn achieves the highest number of correct proofs, but also has a sig-
nificant amount of incorrect proofs. CPAchecker is the slowest of the three tools
and finds fewer proofs than SeaHorn, but CPAchecker has no wrong proofs,
and also closely leads in the amount of found bugs. The score-based quantile plot
of these results displayed in Fig. 12 visualizes the effects of incorrect results on
the computed score. While the graph for SeaHorn is longer, i.e., shows that it
solved the most tasks, it is offset to the left by a total penalty of −3 344 points,
such that in the end, KI 	←−DF;KIPDR accumulates the highest score because it
has a smaller penalty of only −32 points. The plot also shows again, as in Fig. 4,
that the Java-based CPAchecker has a much higher startup time (about 3 s)
than the other two tools, which return results almost immediately for some tasks.
These results confirm our hypothesis that our previous conclusions are rele-
vant, because they are supported by an implementation that is competitive when
compared to the best available PDR-based tool implementations.
Comparison against the Best Participants of SV-COMP 2019 in the
Category ReachSafety-Loops. Some of the previous experiments appeared
to suggest that KIPDR is a slow invariant generator that causes KI 	←−KIPDR
to be an inferier choice in many cases. While Table 7 only shows a few anecdotal
counterexamples to this interpretation, where KI 	←−KIPDR is marginally faster
than the best verifiers from SV-COMP 2019 on six out of seven selected example
tasks, we will now consider how KI 	←−KIPDR compares to the best verifiers
from SV-COMP 2019 in the subcategory ReachSafety-Loops, which is known to
contain many tasks that require effort to be spent on generating loop invariants.
For a fair comparison, we re-executed our new implementations in the same
environment, i.e., not only on the same hardware configuration but also, unlike
our prior experiments, on Ubuntu 18.04 based on Linux 4.15. In this newer
execution environment, the Java version used was OpenJDK 11.0.
Table 8 shows the results for all 208 verification tasks of the SV-COMP 2019
subcategory ReachSafety-Loops, 59 of which contain bugs, while the other 149 are
considered to be safe, for the best three verifiers in that category, namely Ulti-
mate Automizer, Ultimate Taipan, and VeriAbs, as well as for KI 	←−KIPDR
and KI 	←−DF;KIPDR. While the SV-COMP competitors clearly solve more
tasks correctly and obtain a significantly higher score than KI 	←−KIPDR and
KI 	←−DF;KIPDR, we notice that for the tasks they can solve correctly, the
two PDR -based k -induction configurations have significantly lower median
CPU times than the SV-COMP competitors, and that KI 	←−KIPDR uses only
about half as much CPU time in the arithmetic mean than the other config-
urations. For the same set of benchmarks, i.e., the subcategory ReachSafety-
Loops of SV-COMP 2019, Fig. 13 directly compares the CPU times spent on
tasks by both VeriAbs (x-axis), which was the best verifier in that subcategory,
and KI 	←−KIPDR (y-axis), to visualize the differences in efficiency between the
two configurations. We observe that there are more tasks solved by VeriAbs
for which KI 	←−KIPDR exceeds its time limit than there are tasks solved by
KI 	←−KIPDR for which VeriAbs exceeds its time limit, but we also see that
for the majority of tasks that were solved by both verifiers, KI 	←−KIPDR is
faster than VeriAbs, in a significant amount of cases even by more than an
order of magnitude. This shows that the invariant generator KIPDR is not nec-
Table 8: Results for all 208 verification tasks of the SV-COMP 2019 subcategory
ReachSafety-Loops, 59 of which contain bugs, while the other 149 are considered
to be safe, for the best three verifiers in that category (Ultimate Automizer, Ul-
timate Taipan, and VeriAbs), as well as for KI 	←−KIPDR and KI 	←−DF;KIPDR.
Verifier
SV-COMP 2019
KI 	←−KIPDR
KI 	←−DF;
KIPDRUAutomizer UTaipan VeriAbs
Score 221 234 307 192 215
Correct results 144 150 182 114 126
Correct proofs 109 116 125 78 89
Correct alarms 35 34 57 36 37
Wrong proofs 1 1 0 0 0
Wrong alarms 0 0 0 0 0
Timeouts 56 52 18 85 76
Out of memory 0 0 2 2 1
Other inconclusive 7 5 6 7 5
Times for correct results
Total CPU Time (h) 1.1 1.1 4.9 0.44 1.2
Mean CPU Time (s) 28 27 97 14 34
Median CPU Time (s) 9.7 10 27 5.5 6.2
Total Wall Time (h) 0.77 0.72 3.8 0.23 0.60
Mean Wall Time (s) 19 17 75 7.3 17
Median Wall Time (s) 3.4 3.7 11 2.9 3.2
essarily slower than other approaches, and that on the contrary, it can even be
significantly faster than other approaches, depending on the benchmark set.
In conclusion, compared to the PDR -based verifiers and compared to the
state-of-the-art verifiers that participated in SV-COMP, our PDR -based invari-
ant generator obtains promising results. ✓
4.12 Threats to Validity
External validity: We identify the following threats to the external validity of
our experiments: (1) We used the largest and most diverse publicly available
benchmark for software verification, but the risk remains that our conclusions
are limited to the kinds of programs represented by the benchmark. As there
were only two verifiers with support for PDR participating in the competition,
this benchmark might contain few or no verification tasks that are easy for PDR
and difficult for the other techniques. We tried to limit this bias towards large C
programs by using path programs [6] (a way to reduce the complexity for the in-
variant generator), and we also added a few “hand-made” programs that explore
the boundaries of expressive power of the approaches. (2) Our benchmark set
contains only C programs, because this is the only language supported by all of
the evaluated tools. Therefore, there is no guarantee that our results can be trans-
ferred to programs written in other programming languages, for example software
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Fig. 13: Scatter plot comparing the CPU times spent on tasks by VeriAbs and
KI 	←−KIPDR
written in functional programming languages. Moreover, it might be possible that
PDR-based model checkers for hardware perform better on programs that are
converted from C to transition systems that those model checkers use.
Internal validity: In our benchmarking environment, we execute up to four pro-
cesses in parallel on each machine to make our large experimental study feasible.
A drawback of the resulting shared usage of hardware resources (such as caches
or buses) [8] is that this setup may cause some minor noise in the measurements.
However, we use the benchmarking framework BenchExec to properly account
for the resources (CPU time and memory) of each process and its subprocesses
and to ensure that for each physical core of the execution machines, both of
its processing units (virtual cores) are allocated to the same process to avoid
the measurement errors occurring from shared CPU resources or from dynamic
relocation of processes by the OS scheduler, and to avoid performance influences
from non-uniform memory access (NUMA) by ensuring that all executions only
use memory belonging to their exclusively assigned CPU cores.
5 Conclusion
Property-directed reachability (a.k.a. IC3) is a verification approach that is pop-
ular and successful in some fields of formal verification (e.g., hardware designs,
Horn clauses). Unfortunately, there is a large gap between this success story
and the applicability in practical software verification. We are closing this gap
by (a) providing a well-engineered implementation of one published adaptation
of PDR to software verification, (b) designing and implementing an invariant
generator based on the ideas of PDR, and (c) providing an evaluation of all
applicable tools and approaches on the largest available benchmark set of C
verification tasks. This provides a good foundation as baseline for ongoing re-
search in this area.
The results of our comparative evaluation extend the knowledge about PDR
for software verification in the following ways: (1) Our implementation outper-
forms the existing implementation of PDR (Vvt) and is more precise than the
other software verifier that uses PDR (SeaHorn). Thus, our implementation
can serve as a reference implementation for further research on PDR for soft-
ware verification. (2) On most of the programs in the widely used sv-benchmarks
collection of verification tasks, other techniques are more effective (solve more
problems) and more efficient (solve the problems faster). (3) PDR can be an effec-
tive and efficient technique for computing invariants that are difficult to obtain:
there are programs for which our PDR-based approach is more efficient than the
best invariant generator from SV-COMP in the subcategory ReachSafety-Loops.
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